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Abstract: In the texts in which Immanuel Kant discusses the principles 
governing international relations—including texts explicitly dealing with the 
sources leading states to armed conflict and the circumstances enabling its 
cessation—he does not directly engage the question “What constitutes victory 
in war?” This should not be surprising, given that Kant’s treatment of war 
may be read as consonant with just war thinking for which victory seems an 
unproblematic concept Yet there are elements in the tone and the substance 
of his discussion that destabilize a placement of his views as 
unproblematically part of that tradition. The mordant tone of his dismissal of 
the Realpolitik guiding “political moralists” suggests a trenchant skepticism 
about almost any justification offered for leading a state into war. More 
substantively, an antinomy is at work in the contrast Kant makes, in the two 
sets of articles for perpetual peace, between a “state of nature” that, 
construed from the standpoint of the theoretical use of reason, defines the 
order of international relations as necessarily one of constant war, and the 
radical transformation of that order, enacted by moral reason in the definitive 
articles of perpetual peace, into a cosmopolitan order that heeds the 
categorical imperative “there shall be no war.” In consequence, one may 
construct a Kantian answer to the question “What constitutes victory in war?” 
by framing it in reference to this cosmopolitan hope for an international order 
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securing enduring peace. Within the moral horizon of cosmopolitan hope, 
victory in war—like war itself—is unmasked as morally unintelligible. 
Keywords: Victory; War; Perpetual peace; Kant; Categorical imperative; 
Practical reason 
In the various texts in which he discusses the principles that 
should govern relations among nations, including the texts in which he 
explicitly deals with the circumstances and the motivations that lead 
states to engage one another in armed conflict and the circumstances 
that enable its cessation, Immanuel Kant does not directly engage the 
question “What constitutes victory in war?”1 This should not be all that 
surprising: There is much in Kant’s account of war as ingredient in the 
dynamics of the political order of sovereign states and in his proposal 
for instituting a federation of states as the basis for an international 
order conducive to the securing of perpetual peace that can be read as 
consonant with the main elements of “just war” thinking, for which 
victory has not ordinarily loomed as a problematic concept. 
Yet beneath what initially looks like an unremarkable 
endorsement of the just war principles that in Kant’s time were already 
emerging as a substantive moral point of reference for international 
law, there are elements in both the tone and the substance of his 
discussion that destabilize too easily placing his views as 
unproblematically part of that tradition. The tone of mordant irony 
that, in Perpetual Peace, pervades his treatment of war, most notably 
in his treatment of the “principles” by which “political moralists” justify 
the use of force as an instrument of policy in an international order 
that they view as Hobbes’s “state of nature” writ large, manifests a 
trenchant skepticism about almost any justification offered for leading 
a state into war.2 More substantively, there is also a destabilizing 
complexity to the conceptual landscape of international conflict and its 
resolution that he maps in the arguments put forth in Perpetual Peace 
and which are complemented by discussions in other texts, such as 
The Metaphysics of Morals, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason, the second essay in The Conflict of the Faculties, and the third 
part of the essay “Theory and Practice.” 
This complexity arises not simply from the challenge of 
attempting to articulate an account of Kant’s definitive view of the 
moral status of war from a set of texts, published between 1784 and 
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1798, that give evidence of shifts and developments in his thinking.3 It 
also arises from the tensions built into fundamental structure of his 
overall critical philosophy. This tension has its specific locus in the “two 
standpoints,” the theoretical and the practical, that he takes to be 
necessarily embedded in the uses of human finite reason as it seeks to 
render intelligible our human engagement with the world.4 Even as 
Kant resolutely maintains that these standpoints function within the 
unity of one and the same reason, this does not prevent him from 
unflinching recognition that, to the extent that human reason remains 
uncritical, i.e., undisciplined by a consciously appropriated awareness 
of the limits set by reason’s finitude, these two standpoints will 
present themselves to us in the form of seemingly irreconcilable 
antinomies for our efforts to render the world intelligible. 
For Kant, human reason’s drive to “make sense of” what it is to 
be human, provides the fundamental thrust and trajectory to his 
critical project. Kant argues that antinomies arise within this drive to 
make sense of the human when human reason steps beyond the limits 
that constrain its legitimate exercise for theoretical cognition to the 
conditions of space and time, which provide parameters for the causal 
necessity that renders intelligible the empirical workings of world. In 
stepping beyond those limits, theoretical reason ventures into a field in 
which intelligibility is not a function of causal necessity but a function 
rather of the agential freedom for determining ends that Kant calls 
moral autonomy. This field is properly the domain for the exercise of 
the practical use of reason. Kant further argues that, relative to each 
other, it is the practical use of reason that has primacy above its 
theoretical use with respect to the overarching “interest” of reason in 
rendering intelligible the human place in the cosmos. Within this 
framework, antinomies can thus be seen to arise in consequence of 
giving unreflective primacy to the empirical intelligibility arising from 
the theoretical use of reason in place of the reflective moral primacy 
that arises from the enactments of the practical use of reason. Once 
such antinomies are recognized, they can then be resolved by an 
effective recognition of the primacy of reason’s moral use. 
It may initially seem that the overarching issue of the unity of a 
human reason that functions both theoretically and practically within 
the structure of Kant’s critical enterprise may have little direct bearing 
upon constructing a plausible Kantian response to the specific question 
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“What does it meant to win a war?” let alone upon resolving the thorny 
questions raised by his proposals for an international cosmopolitan 
order that envisions the cessation of war as its moral outcome. My 
argument in this essay, nonetheless, will begin from a suggestion that 
we can, in fact, locate such an antinomy at work in Kant’s account of 
the moral dynamics by which human moral agency is empowered to 
transform what appears to be the (theoretical) inevitability of war 
within an international “state of nature” into the moral possibility of 
establishing a world order for enduring peace. My suggestion is that 
this antinomy functions specifically in the relationship between what he 
calls the “preliminary” and the “definitive” articles for perpetual peace. 
This relationship, particularly with respect to the mode of transition 
from the former to the latter, is not fully articulated in Kant’s text; my 
proposal is that, given the larger framework of Kant’s understanding of 
the workings of reason, we attempt to read this relationship in terms 
of the dynamics of the tension between the two standpoints of human 
finite reason, theoretical and practical, that give rise to the antinomies 
that mark human reason’s “peculiar fate” in the absence of the 
discipline of self-limitation he terms “critique.”5 
Within this reading, the intelligibility of the “preliminary” articles 
stands within the ambit of a theoretical standpoint for which war is a 
necessary and inevitable outcome of a lawless “state of nature” among 
sovereign nations; the intelligibility of the “definitive articles,” in 
contrast, arises from the standpoint of the exercise and the primacy of 
practical (moral) reason, for which the definitive cessation of war is a 
possibility that human agency is called upon to effect in response to 
the categorical imperative “there shall be no war.”6 This moral 
possibility for the definitive cessation of war is one that stands beyond 
the ambit of the intelligibility provided by the theoretical standpoint, in 
that both its intelligibility and its enactment are mutually a function of 
human moral freedom, exercised as the practical use of reason, not 
the outcome of the inexorable casual workings of the world that are 
decipherable by reason’s theoretical use. 
How, then, does this account of the origin and resolution of such 
antinomies help to articulate the relationship between the 
“preliminary” and the “definitive” articles that Kant proposes in 
Perpetual Peace? The answer to this question lies, I suggest, in 
coordinating the distinction between these articles with the distinction 
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Kant makes between “the moral politician” and the “political moralist” 
in the first Appendix in the essay. The preliminary articles are 
preliminary inasmuch as—in the absence of the effective enactment of 
the definitive articles—their intelligibility can be rendered adequately in 
terms of the theoretical use of reason. They can all be adopted on the 
basis of a calculating political prudence—such as that used by the 
“political moralist”—in which each state continues to reserve the 
possibility of making its own interest ultimately and solely decisive. 
The resolution of this antinomy depends upon an acknowledgment of 
primacy of reason’s moral use; in this case, it is “moral politician,” not 
the “political moralist,” who is in a position to make such an 
acknowledgment. Such acknowledgment consists in giving decisive 
weight to the categorical imperative, “there shall be no war,” and it is 
only in virtue of such an acknowledgment that the transition from the 
first to the second set of articles can be concretely navigated by 
sovereign nations. Only moral, not prudential, grounds stand sufficient 
for establishing the enduring peace that definitively enacts the 
categorical imperative “there shall be no war.” 
In consequence, the contrast Kant draws between the “moral 
politician” and the “political moralist” is crucial to the resolution of this 
antinomy, inasmuch as only the former stands ready to enact the 
primacy of moral reason in the concrete exercise of the political 
judgments needed to bring the definitive articles into effect. The 
substance and the tone of Kant’s dismissal of the Realpolitik that 
guides “political moralists” even as they pay lip service to principles of 
constitutional law and international order is thus one marker of the 
tension of this underlying antinomy. This antinomy lies between a 
“state of nature” that, as construed from the standpoint of the 
theoretical use of reason, defines the extant order of international 
relations as necessarily and evermore one of constant war, and the 
radical transformation of that order, enacted by the exercise of moral 
reason in the definitive articles for perpetual peace, into a 
cosmopolitan order that heeds the categorical imperative “there shall 
be no war.” In the first, “it is absolutely clear that the right to go to 
war surfaces only in the tense and unstable condition of the absence of 
the full recognition of law amongst states…it is simply a right in the 
absence of right” (Williams 2012); in the second, the transformation of 
that order is such that it provides “conditions under which states would 
come to abandon war altogether as the means for settling disputes 
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about their rights” (Covell 1998). Within this context, it may not be 
far-fetched to suggest that the transition from the preliminary to the 
definitive articles has a precondition that human beings as political 
agents and actors undergo “a revolution in the disposition of [their] 
human being” that is the counterpart of the “revolution” that Kant sees 
requisite for each human moral agent’s overcoming of “radical evil”.7 
In other words, the “political moralist” needs to be moved to 
undertake a moral transformation that will make her a “moral 
politician.” 
Taken together, these elements suggest the presence of a 
trajectory in Kant’s thinking about war that stands athwart just war 
thinking, a trajectory that arises from his account of the principles of 
human moral self-governance (i.e., autonomy) that are operative in 
the practical use of reason. This trajectory, moreover, is one that 
provides a fundamental orientation for Kant’s understanding of the 
responsibility human agents have, as autonomous participants in the 
shaping of history, for establishing, through the exercise of practical 
reason, the social, political, and cultural conditions of a cosmopolitan 
international order that will make it possible to bring about lasting 
peace among nations. It will be this cosmopolitan trajectory of 
enacting the primacy of practical reason in history that provides the 
basis for what I will argue may be appropriately called a Kantian moral 
“deconstruction” of the concept of “victory” in its common usage in 
political, military, and diplomatic discourse to mark the cessation of 
combat that ensues upon the military and political capitulation of one 
side to the other. 
In order to set out the contours of such a Kantian 
“deconstruction” it will be useful first to note that this cosmopolitan 
trajectory toward the historical enactment of the primacy of practical 
reason suggests that any endorsement that Kant makes of just war 
principles is, at best, a function of what he sees as only provisional 
steps within the working of human history in the direction of the 
establishment of an international order that will provide definitive 
conditions for securing perpetual peace.8 Prior to the establishment of 
those conditions, wars—and, consequently, the characterization of 
victory in a war—occur as (and have their theoretical intelligibility as) 
events that are woven into the conflictual fabric of human social 
interaction in history. According to Kant’s account of these provisional 
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steps, humans first find themselves in a (juridical) “state of nature” 
that is marked by contention with one another. It should be noted that 
Kant’s account of this state of nature as a “state of externally lawless 
freedom”9 does not unconditionally endorse the totally self-regarding 
anthropological presuppositions embedded in the Hobbesian rendering 
of this state of as bellum omnium contra omnes. Even so, Kant does 
take emulation, competition, and invidious comparison, which he 
emblematically renders as “unsocial sociability,” to be a social dynamic 
powerful enough regularly to bring about conflicts that require external 
constraint for their resolution. Although these are conflicts between 
individuals, not states, Kant does not hesitate to name them “war.” 
Bringing these conflicts to an end requires bringing individuals, 
coercively if necessary, into the civil order of a particular state that, by 
framing laws according to the “principle of right,”10 provides 
enforceable rules for the external governance of the mutual exercise of 
human freedom in order to limit and adjudicate such conflicts. One 
consequence is that what might have been considered the “victory” of 
one party over another in the context of physical contention in the 
state of nature, is now transposed into an adjudicatory context of a 
court of law in which a third party with civil jurisdiction determines the 
outcome. 
Bringing individuals into a “juridico-civil” state is thus just the 
initial stage in Kant’s account of the steps that lead to the 
establishment of the social conditions under which it become possible 
for the exercise of human practical reason to be an effective agency in 
the establishment of the cosmopolitan world order to bring about the 
perpetual peace that Kant considers the “highest political good” for 
humanity.11 The civil order that a state establishes to bring individuals 
out of state of nature in which civil adjudication replaces physical 
contention among those individuals does not, however, also provide 
conditions that are sufficient to resolve conflicts that arise between 
and among states. In fact, Kant considers the condition that exists 
among the various juridico-civil states to constitute an international 
state of nature in which war is the default position. This international 
state of nature is one that he describes as significantly more 
challenging to alter than the one that existed between individuals prior 
to the establishment of civil society. This is so because he sees no 
authority higher than that of the sovereignty of each individual state 
that could legitimate the coercive means that would be needed to 
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bring states together into the international counterpart of a juridico-
civil state.12 As a result the fundamental “right” that nations exercise 
within this condition can be nothing other than a “right of war”: 
The public right of states (jus publicum civitatum) in their 
relations to one another is what we have to consider under the 
designation of the “Right of Nations.” Wherever a state, viewed as a 
moral person, acts in relation to another existing in the condition of 
natural freedom, and consequently in a state of continual war, such 
right takes it rise.13 
Within this condition of an international state of nature, “victory” 
in a particular war between contending states becomes an outcome 
that has an inherent instability to it. Kant understands the dynamics at 
work between nations in this condition to be such that both victors and 
vanquished, in the absence of any constraining force, will, upon 
agreement to a treaty concluding the current war, immediately begin 
to take preparatory steps for resuming armed hostilities, if not with 
one another, then with some other state considered ripe for 
confrontation and conquest. What Kant calls the Preliminary Articles 
for perpetual peace thus do not address themselves directly to this 
baseline condition of international lawlessness; they are proposed 
primarily in the hope that their acceptance will then make possible the 
further steps required, under the Definitive Articles, for nations to exit 
from this condition.14 The preliminary steps thus function as precepts 
which accord with a prudential judgment that bears upon each state’s 
assessment of what is efficacious for its self-interest. Unlike the 
Definitive Articles, however, they do not arise in function of the hope 
for moral efficacy in establishing conditions for perpetual peace that 
the exercise of practical reason makes possible in providing a 
cosmopolitan perspective upon the historical trajectory of human 
action. Put in terms of the antinomy that structures their relation, the 
theoretical intelligibility of the Preliminary Articles, while sufficient to 
provide precepts for prudential calculation of policies that serve a 
state’s interest, any or all of which may be in accord with moral 
principles, does not provide those articles—let alone the Definitive 
Articles—with an adequate and appropriate moral intelligibility. The 
requisite moral intelligibility can only be provided in function of the 
acknowledgment of the primacy of practical reason, an 
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acknowledgment that is performed in the recognition and enactment of 
the categorical imperative “there shall be no war.” 
There thus are elements in Kant’s presentation of these 
preliminary articles that, even in view of their primarily theoretical and 
prudential character, can be construed to bear upon the question of 
what constitutes victory. Of most general significance in this regard is 
that these six articles presuppose the continuing operation of the 
conflictual dynamics of the international state of nature. Under these 
articles, the basic structural circumstances of the “international state 
of nature”—i.e., individual sovereign states “independent of external 
laws”15—remain in place, including its motivational dynamics of 
prudently exercised and theoretically justified national self-interest. 
The articles are framed to regulate a set of conditions likely to bring on 
new (or renewed) armed hostilities, but they do not aim at altering the 
fundamental conditions of the international state of nature; in 
consequence, the arguments Kant offers on their behalf do not directly 
appeal, as do the arguments he offers for the Definitive Articles, to the 
self-governing moral freedom (autonomy) that is the most basic of 
Kant’s moral principles. His arguments for the preliminary articles are 
thus couched in terms that, even as they reference important moral 
considerations, also recognize the decisive operative weight that that 
pragmatic and prudential considerations of national interest continue 
to play in the international state of nature, even with the adoption of 
these preliminary articles. 
Of specific note with respect to the significance and meaning of 
“victory,” moreover, is the first article, “No Treaty of Peace Shall Be 
Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War,” 
that bears directly upon the possibility and effectiveness of peace 
treaties, which are presumed to be the instruments that formalize 
terms of victory and defeat. Kant remarks that, in the absence of the 
first article, “a treaty would be only a truce, a suspension of 
hostilities.”16 Yet Kant does not then conclude that a peace treaty that 
observes the terms of this first article would thereby have the effect of 
securing lasting peace. Rather, any “victory” that is secured in a such 
peace treaty, even if it is a settlement reached after an (ex hypothesi) 
justly declared war that is both waged justly and then meets the 
conditions for what Kant considers a just mode for its termination, still 
stands within the ambit of an international order that, even under the 
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Preliminary Articles, remains “only the negative surrogate of an 
alliance that averts war”17 in which no such “victory” can stand as 
definitive.18 
This point is of direct significance for engaging Kant’s account 
with the question “What does it mean to win a war?” Kant’s attribution 
of a provisional status to “victory,” so long as the international state of 
nature obtains, is a function of the way he places his understanding of 
the moral status and historical significance of war and, a fortiori, of 
victory in war, within the larger lineaments of his account of human 
moral life. In that account, the standpoint that the practical (moral) 
use of our human reason enables us to take upon the trajectory of 
humanity’s moral vocation in history toward securing lasting peace is 
central to Kant’s analysis and assessment of the politics and the 
morality of war and its outcomes. I will thus propose that we turn 
again to situating Kant’s discussions of war within that larger context 
of the practical use of our human reason, which provides the basis 
from which to elaborate what amounts to Kant’s deconstruction of 
“victory” in war, particular with respect to any substantive moral 
weight that we might be tempted to attach to this concept. Central to 
that deconstruction will be the conceptual coordinates provided by 
Kant’s account of the cosmopolitan perspective that moral reason 
enables us to take upon the workings of history and upon the outcome 
of human action as ingredient in giving shape and direction to 
history.19 These coordinates are central to articulating the import of 
the structural framework of national and international governance that 
the three Definitive Articles propose as the catalyst for transforming 
the international state of nature into a cosmopolitan world order in 
which, because there are no wars, “victory” has ceased to be a 
functioning concept in the discourse of international relations. 
The main coordinates will be provided, not surprisingly, by the 
taxonomy according to which Kant takes human finite reason to 
function as the principle for the two fundamental ways, i.e., by our 
thinking and by our action, in which we address the challenge to make 
sense of the world. In Kant’s terminology, one way, the way of 
thinking, is exhibited in the speculative (theoretical) use of our reason, 
the other way, the way of action, is exhibited in the practical (moral) 
use of our reason. Kant further posits that, even though these ways 
are irreducible to one another, they stem from a single source, the 
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dynamism of our reason (which he terms the “interest of reason”) to 
render intelligible, both for our thinking and for our acting, the world 
we engage and our human place in that world. Kant elaborates this 
taxonomy in his three major works of “critique”—the Critique of Pure 
Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of 
Judgment—published between 1781 and 1790. Although a key aspect 
of the taxonomy he enunciates in those works is the primacy that he 
assigns to the workings of the practical (moral) use of reason, there 
are important implications of that primacy that emerge with full force 
and clarity only in texts that have often been relegated by later 
commentators to peripheral status relative to the three Critiques. 
These texts include a number of the occasional essays on culture, 
history, and politics that he published beginning in the mid-1780s as 
well as major texts from the 1790s such as Religion within the 
Boundaries of mere Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals. A 
particularly important set of implications that emerge in these later 
writings help to articulate the role that the practical use of reason 
takes in shaping the socio-cultural, historical, and political contours of 
humanity’s world to accord with what Kant calls a “cosmopolitan point 
of view.” 
Within Kant’s taxonomy of reason, the perspective that exhibits 
the theoretical use of reason takes the array of socio-cultural and 
political dynamics constituting human history as the outcome of forces 
functioning in modes of natural causality that proceed on a course 
indifferent to individual and collective human intentionality and 
purposes. This perspective takes the outcome and direction of history 
to issue from the intersection of contingent causal processes within 
which free human determination of action has no distinctive place; 
human action in and upon history is, at best, simply one other causal 
process at work in a field that has no overarching inner directionality, 
save that which issues from the intersecting vectors of those causal 
processes, including those intertwined with the promotion of the self-
interest that is a natural function of human inclinations. From such a 
perspective, we stand as spectators before whom events unfold from 
dynamisms upon which we have no distinctive point of purchase. Such 
a theoretical perspective comports well with the dynamisms that Kant 
describes functioning within the international state of nature. Their 
inevitable outcome is a constant state of war and of preparation for 
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war in which the single operative “right” that can function as “a law of 
nations” is a “right to war.” 
Kant’s description of these dynamics, especially in Perpetual 
Peace, is cast in ironic tone that occasionally sounds a sardonic note. 
After noting that the “concept of a law of nations as a right to make 
war does not really mean anything” he adds “[t]he only conceivable 
meaning of such a law of nations might be that it serves men right 
who are so inclined that they should destroy each other and thus find 
perpetual peace in the vast grave that swallows both the atrocities and 
their perpetrators.”20 While there is a Hobbesian resonance to this 
remark, Kant does not offer it in support of resignation to the 
continuance of the international order as a “state of nature” in which 
war is the constant and inevitable outcome. This remark enunciates, 
instead, a mordant counterpoint to the cosmopolitan perspective, 
which on Kant’s account makes possible a transformative 
reconceptualization of “the law of nations” into an order of hospitality 
that will radically undermine any moral legitimacy to the possibility of 
war. What thus had been the sole international right of the law of 
nations in an international state of nature, i.e., the “right to make 
war,” is superseded in a cosmopolitan world order by “the right to 
cosmopolitan hospitality.”21 
The basis on which Kant proposes such a radical reconstitution 
of international order is moral, rather than prudential. This basis is 
found the practical (moral) exercise of our reason, inasmuch as it 
pronounces—and human moral agents heed—its “irresistible veto 
‘there is to be no war.’”22 Heeding that injunction of reason as a 
categorical imperative makes possible the cosmopolitan hope, 
validated in the exercise of moral reason, that human efforts can be 
effective in establishing conditions for lasting peace. Such 
cosmopolitan hope, moreover, is social: it provides agents with a way 
to envision the exercise of their freedom not simply as it bears upon 
their own individual moral destiny but also upon the social outcomes of 
history and culture.23 It thereby enables them to envision the highest 
good attained through human freedom to pertain to humanity as a 
whole, to humanity as a socially and historically situated species, not 
merely to individual human agents.24 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
[Citation Journal/Monograph Title, Vol XX, No. XX (m yyyy): pg. XX-XX. DOI. This article is © [Publisher’s Name] and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Publisher’s Name] does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
[Publisher’s Name].] 
13 
 
What bearing does this then have on the prospect of framing a 
plausible Kantian answer to the question “What constitutes victory in 
war?” The fundamental import of placing the question about the 
meaning of victory within the horizon of a cosmopolitan hope is that it 
indicates that such an answer would be most appropriately framed in 
reference the establishment of an international order for enduring 
peace secured within the moral horizon of the Definitive Articles, 
rather than within the theoretical and prudential horizon offered in the 
Preliminary Articles. As a result, Kant’s answer would thus not be 
referenced to “just war” principles that seem to remain operative 
under the Preliminary Articles. Within the prudential horizon of those 
articles, victory bears only the conventional, prudential meaning of the 
cessation of hostilities by the military and political capitulation of one 
of the parties to the armed conflict. In contrast, when “victory” is 
instead viewed within the horizon of the moral possibility for the end of 
war that is provided by a cosmopolitan hope in the efficacy of human 
action for securing perpetual peace, it undergoes a definitive moral 
deconstruction. As it does to war itself, a cosmopolitan perspective 
unmasks victory in war as morally unintelligible. 
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Notes 
1 Among the key texts dealing with war are “Idea for a Universal History from 
a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (1784), “On the Common Saying: That 
May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of no Use in Practice” (1793), 
Perpetual Peace (1795), The Metaphysics of Morals; The Doctrine of 
Right (1797), and “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race 
Constantly Progressing?” (1798). Page references to Kant’s text are to 
appropriate volume and page numbers in the standard German critical 
edition of his works, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd 1–22 hrsg. von 
der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1900–), usually 
referenced as the Akademie-Ausgabe (AA), and currently published by 
De Gruyter, Berlin. Page references to the Critique of Pure Reason are 
to the original pagination of the 1st (A) and the 2nd (B) editions of the 
Critique. English translations are from the appropriate volume of The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1995–). 
2 Most notably in Perpetual Peace, Appendix I: On the Opposition between 
Morality and Politics with Respect to Perpetual Peace. He draws a 
distinction in this section between the “moral politician…who so 
chooses political principles that they are consistent with those of 
morality” and the “political moralist…who forges a morality in such a 
way that it conforms to the statesman’s advantage” (AA 8:372). 
3 It may be useful to note that this essay does not claim to present Kant’s 
“definitive view” about what constitutes victory in war, especially since 
it is a question he neither frames nor explicitly addresses. This essay 
presents, instead, an exploration of consequences for Kant’s account 
of war and the place of “victory” in war that would follow from giving 
interpretive primacy to the most fundamental moral claim he makes 
with respect to war. That claim is that “there shall be no war” is a 
categorical imperative to be constantly heeded by the human moral 
subjects whose agency gives human society its concrete historical 
shape. 
4 This reading of the “two standpoints” is part of a larger interpretive account 
of Kant’s critical project in which the fundamental dynamic of human 
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reason is construed in anthropological terms: human finite reason is 
constituted by a drive to render intelligible, to “make sense of,” what it 
is to be human. A provocative discussion of this anthropological thrust 
in the critical enterprise can be found in Neiman (1994), Chapter 5, 
“The Task of Philosophy,” 185–206. 
5 Kant speaks of reason’s “peculiar fate” in the first sentence of the Preface to 
the 1st edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, A vii. 
6 Two key passages in which Kant identifies “there shall be no war” as a 
categorical imperative are found in Perpetual Peace (AA 8: 355–356) 
and The Metaphysics of Morals (AA 6: 354–355). 
7 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, AA 6: 47. 
8 See Mertens (2012) for a probing criticism of efforts that have been made to 
place Kant squarely within the traditions of just war thinking. A more 
extensive treatment of Kant’s relationship to just war thinking that 
also disputes his placement within that tradition is Howard Williams, 
Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory. Williams 
notes at the outset (p. 3) that “one of [his] major concerns is to re-
establish Kant’s reputation as a critic of just war thinking.” 
9 The Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Right §42, “The Postulate of Public 
Right” (AA 6: 307–308). 
10 This principle, as enunciated in The Metaphysics of Morals is: “Every action 
is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such 
that it can co-exist along with the freedom of the will of each and all 
inaction, according to a universal law” (AA 6: 230). 
11 The Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Right, Conclusion (AA 6: 355). 
12 There has been a long standing discussion among commentators about 
whether Kant takes the definitive form of the relation among states 
needed to provide conditions for perpetual peace to be a confederation 
in which individuals states retain sovereignty or a single world state. 
One recent attempt to chart the varied readings that Kant’s views have 
been given from the mid-nineteenth century onward is Easley (2004). 
Kleingeld (2012), Chapter 3, “Kant and Cloots on global peace,” 40–
71, provides a useful account of the development of Kant’s thinking on 
this point. 
13 Metaphysics of Morals, §53, AA 6: 343. 
14 My discussion here elides over a significant question about the relationship 
between Kant’s presentation of two sets of “Articles” for perpetual 
peace in his 1795 essay and his later, condensed presentation of 1797 
in §61 of The Metaphysics of Morals: The Doctrine of Right (AA 6: 
350–351) of his proposal for a permanent congress of nations as the 
vehicle for perpetual peace in which there is no mention of 
“preliminary articles.” Williams, Kant and the End of War, extensively 
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discusses the overlap and the differences between these two texts in 
Chapters 2–5, 40–112. 
15 Perpetual Peace, AA 8: 354. 
16 Perpetual Peace, AA 8: 343. 
17 Perpetual Peace, AA 8: 357. 
18 A crucial difference between the two sets of articles—though one that Kant 
does not explicitly state—is that compliance with all (or any) of the 
preliminary articles does not require that the state that agrees to them 
has a republican form of polity. The importance of this difference for 
the transformational character of the definitive articles is underscored, 
I believe, by the fact that the first of the Definitive Articles is: “The 
Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican” (AA 8: 349). 
19 For further discussion of Kant’s cosmopolitanism as a practical (moral) 
perspective on the efficacy of human action in history see, Rossi 
(2008, 2013). 
20 AA 8: 357. The play on the word “right” is in the original; the vast grave is 
an allusion back to the image with which Kant begins the essay: a 
graveyard that a Dutch innkeeper used on the sign for his 
establishment (AA 8: 343). 
21 The Metaphysics of Morals: The Doctrine of Right, §62 (AA 6: 352–353). 
22 AA 6: 354. 
23 To the extent that Kant’s account invests the agency of the state in respect 
to the international order in the sovereign ruler, it is the sovereign who 
then has primary responsibility for a social envisioning that accords 
with the moral hope that a cosmopolitan perspective offers. This is one 
of the features of Perpetual Peace that suggests that a key part of the 
audience for this essay that Kant had in view were the monarchs of 
Europe, perhaps in the hope of inviting their transformation from 
“political moralists” into “moral politicians.” 
24 To the extent that the highest good, as it pertains to individuals, consists in 
forming a “good will,” it may be construed, as G. Felicitas Munzel 
argues in Kant’s Conception of Moral Character (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), to be the shaping of one’s good moral character. 
